How Commonsense Consumption Acts Are Preventing
“Big Food” Litigation
Grace Thompson
INTRODUCTION
America needs a health transformation. The data and statistics seem
irreversible and continue to accelerate in the wrong direction. Obesity
plagues 36.5% of adults in the U.S. and 17% of the youth.1 Obesity in
children has more than tripled over the last thirty years.2 An even larger
proportion of Americans—around 64.5%—are considered overweight
based on a Body Mass Index calculation.3 The United States Surgeon
General predicted this weight epidemic back in 2003.4 He went so far as
declaring terrorism less of a threat to our health than the obesity epidemic.5
Indeed, it is undeniable that serious health risks are associated with
obesity. Obesity has been linked to high blood pressure, coronary heart
disease, several cancers, type 2 diabetes, osteoarthritis, sleep apnea, low
quality of life, and even mental illnesses such as clinical depression and
anxiety.6
The problem goes beyond health; it affects many aspects of our
economy as well. Approximately $147–210 billion per year is spent on
medical costs related to adult obesity alone (increased from the $93 billion
estimated in 2003).7 Health care costs comprise approximately 9.1% of
 Juris Doctorate candidate 2018 at Seattle University School of Law. I would like to thank the
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1. CYNTHIA L. OGDEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PREVALENCE OF OBESITY
AMONG ADULTS AND YOUTH: UNITED STATES2011–2014 (2015), https://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/databriefs/db219.pdf [https://perma.cc/434K-ELCT].
2. Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645,
1649 (2004) [hereinafter Broken Scales].
3. Id. at 1648.
4. Id. at 1649.
5. Id.
6. The Health Effects of Overweight and Obesity, CDC.GOV (June 5, 2015), http://www.
cdc.gov/healthyweight/effects/ [https://perma.cc/2WFW-9WJ2].
7. Broken Scales, supra note 2, at 1651.
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our total national costs, paid for primarily by the government programs
Medicaid and Medicare.8 Moreover, Americans suffering from diseases
and other health concerns are more likely to miss work and eventually
decrease contributions to commerce—especially those with physically
demanding jobs.
One thing is certain: something must change in order to start moving
the statistics in the right direction. While the increasing scale of obesity
and other diet-related health issues in the U.S. demands reform, the legal
avenues for reform are slim. Among these legal impediments, and
arguably presenting the most challenging to health reform progress, are
Commonsense Consumption Acts (CCAs). Twenty-four states have
enacted various forms of CCAs.9 In large part, these laws prohibit
individuals from seeking civil liability for injury or death when the liability
is based on the individual’s health condition related to weight gain or
obesity, or from the individual’s long-term, excessive consumption of
food.10 CCAs aim to protect food corporations, manufacturers, sellers,
trade associations, livestock producers, and retailers of food products from
liability related to consumer lawsuits.11
Only two lawsuits have been filed against food corporations on the
theory that the corporation was civilly liable for health-related conditions
arising from the consumption of its food products. The plaintiffs lost in
both instances. One set of plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District
Court in the South District of New York (“Pelman”). In this suit, two obese
teenagers attempted to sue McDonald’s fast food chain in a class action
litigation asserting that consumption of McDonald’s food was the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ obesity and related health problems.12
The judge denied class certification on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed
to satisfy the elements required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.13
The plaintiffs attempted to file an amended complaint, but the suit was
dismissed, this time with prejudice.14
The second, less well-known case was filed in the United States
District Court in the Western District of New York (“S.F.”). The plaintiffs
claimed several producers negligently designed High Fructose Corn Syrup
and failed to warn consumers about the presence of High Fructose Corn
8. Id.
9. See CHARLES J. NAGY, JR., AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 81:7 (3rd ed. Feb.
2017) [hereinafter AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY].
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 272 F.R.D. 82, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
13. Id. at 100.
14. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 533, 543 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003).
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Syrup in their products.15 The judge dismissed the case in part because the
plaintiff failed to “connect her disease to the actions of any one
defendant.”16 The scarcity of cases filed against food corporations on this
theory of liability, and the dismissive results in these cases, demonstrates
the uphill battle that tort reform has in shaping health reform.
This Note takes a critical look at Commonsense Consumption Acts
and how they are detrimental to the possibility of “Big Food” litigation.
The tobacco industry was held accountable through the effective use of
tort litigation (commonly referred to as “Big Tobacco” litigation), and the
food industry could theoretically be held similarly accountable, but CCAs
are preventing the possibility of similar reform. Therefore, in order for
health reform to be as effective as tobacco reform, CCAs must be repealed
in the states where they exist. Part I of this Note discusses why the food
industry needs tort reform. Specifically, it argues that the food industry
has engaged in deceitful practices that are directly harming the health of
American consumers, just as the tobacco industry did. Class action
lawsuits played a vital role in holding the tobacco industry liable for
tobacco-related illnesses. If CCAs were removed, class action lawsuits
could also make an impact on obesity-related illnesses by holding the food
industry accountable. Part II gives an overview of the different CCAs,
including the legislative impetus behind their enactment and how they
prevent health reform. Part III dives into a variety of foreseeable problems
tort reform faces when taking on the powerful food industry, including
how litigation against the food industry would differ from the–largely
successful litigation against the tobacco industry. Lastly, the Note
concludes with the argument that CCAs must be repealed, in order to move
toward a healthier, more prosperous America.
I. WHY THE FOOD INDUSTRY WARRANTS TORT REFORM
Before we can identify solutions to this obesity epidemic, we must
first understand how we ended up here. Today, the food industry produces
$1 trillion per year in gross profits.17 The Federal Government spends
roughly $2.7 trillion per year on healthcare.18 Approximately 75% of the
money the government spends on healthcare costs goes toward treating
15. S.F. v. Archer–Daniels–Midland Co., No. 13-CV-634S, 2014 WL 1600414, at *1 (W.D.N.Y.
Apr. 21, 2014).
16. Id. at *9.
17. Dr. Robert Lustig, TED Radio Hour: The Food We Eat – How Worried Should We Be About
Sugar?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.npr.org/programs/ted-radiohour/493930098.
18. Id.
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chronic metabolic diseases, which, according to Dr. Robert Lustig, could
be prevented if we did something about our diet.19 He reveals the
government must spend roughly $3 for every $1 the food industry profits
to clean up the mess the big food corporations leave in their wake.20
Instead of focusing our time and energy on treating these diseases, perhaps
we should take a more practical approach by shifting our focus towards
educating the American public and transforming the type of food available
to it.
A.

The Big Players

The food industry is incredibly powerful, with that power
concentrated in only a handful of high-stakes players calling the shots.
According to a report conducted by Oxfam International, ten corporations
“are so powerful that their policies can have a major impact on the diets
and working conditions of people worldwide, as well as on the
environment.”21 Most—if not all—of the ten companies are household
names: Associated British Foods, Coca-Cola Company, Groupe Danone,
General Mills, Kellogg Company, Mars Incorporated, Mondelez
International, Nestle, PepsiCo, and Unilever Group.22 These companies
control the world’s food industry. In 2013, they generated tens of billions
of dollars of revenue, boasting at least $50 billion in assets, and employing
over 1.5 million people.23 They also dominate advertising. In 2012, nine
of the ten companies were among the 100 largest media spenders in the
world.24 For example, that same year, Coca-Cola spent over $3 billion on
advertising, making it the world’s sixth largest advertiser.25
These companies essentially write the food advertising narrative and
control much of the food available, yet they shirk the responsibility to push
for a positive health transformation. This is not surprising—the change
that is needed would negatively impact their sales, profits, and domination
over the industry. In fact, some of these companies are actively and
willfully contributing to the negative impact of their food products on the
health of Americans. Take Coca-Cola, for example. In 2015, the New
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Alexander E.M. Hess, These 10 Companies Control The World’s Food, HUFFINGTON POST
(Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/17/companies-control-food_n_5684782.
html [https://perma.cc/TP8D-E967] (scroll below the article and click “See Gallery” to view the photo
gallery associated with the cited article).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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York Times exposed Coca-Cola for sponsoring scientific studies that
specifically aimed to shift blame away from sugary beverages and
downplay the link between sugar and obesity.26 These health scientists
were not only publishing studies in peer-reviewed scientific journals, they
were also “advancing this message in medical journals, at conferences, and
through social media.”27 As a result, their message spread, reaching the
general public at large.
Companies continue to push their products regardless of health
warnings from prominent organizations. In 2009, the American Heart
Association recommended limiting the amount of added sugars in an
individual’s diet to “no more than half of [the individual’s] daily
discretionary calories allowed.”28 For most American women, this equals
roughly 6 teaspoons, 24 grams, or 100 calories.29 For men, the
recommendation totaled approximately 9 teaspoons, 36 grams, or 150
calories.30 Similarly, in its 2015–2016 recommendations, the Office of
Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (ODPHP) pushed for a
significant limitation in daily intake of added sugars.31 Without
distinguishing between demographics, ODPHP recommended individuals
limit their daily intake of added sugars to less than 10% of total caloric
intake.32 It also recommended limiting saturated fats to less than 10% of
caloric intake per day and sodium intake to less than 2,300 milligrams per
day.33 The ODPHP indicated these specific substances must be limited
because they are “of particular public health concern in the United
States.”34 Despite these health warnings, companies continue to market,
sell, and distribute their sugary products in mass quantities across the
United States.

26. Anahad O’Connor, Coca-Cola Funds Scientists Who Shift Blame for Obesity Away from Bad
Diets, N.Y. TIMES: WELL (Aug. 9, 2015), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/coca-cola-fundsscientists-who-shift-blame-for-obesity-away-from-bad-diets/?_r=0.
27. Id.
28. Added Sugars, AM. HEART ASS’N (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/
HealthyLiving/HealthyEating/Nutrition/Added-Sugars_UCM_305858_Article.jsp#.WO-O61LMzBI
[https://perma.cc/3GWP-7CMP].
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Key Elements of Healthy Eating Patterns, HEALTH.GOV, https://health.gov/
dietaryguidelines/2015/guidelines/chapter-1/key-recommendations/#footnote-3
[https://perma.cc/
FE2X-RCBB].
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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The Illusion that is “Choice”

One of the toughest challenges facing effective tort reform in the
food industry is that of personal autonomy—the idea that we are rational
actors who choose when and what we consume. McDonald’s does not
force its customers to eat fries. General Mills does not require grocery
shoppers to purchase sugary cereal. The idea that we are free actors
making independent, uninfluenced choices is a keystone of the American
identity.35 However, what if “choice,” when it comes to the food we eat, is
merely an illusion? Put differently, if food companies have been pushing
a profit-over-people agenda for decades, then is it possible that most
consumers lost the ability to choose what they eat and when they eat it?
The authors of Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America argue
that society is too willing to attribute responsibility for, and causation of,
health problems to the personal choices of consumers.36 Before discussing
influences that lead to obesity, the article gives an extensive overview of
social psychology.37 It emphasizes the “fundamental attribution error,” or
the tendency to overestimate the influence of personal dispositions and
choice while underestimating situational behavior.38 In other words, social
psychology research, such as Stanley Milgram’s 1963 famous shock
study, indicate that people are heavily influenced by perception, context,
and environment, rather than just by free will.39 This conclusion
contradicts the assertion that human action is driven primarily by
autonomy and choice.
Shifting the conversation to the health epidemic in our country, the
authors discuss multiple ways in which humans, when viewed as
“situational actors,” do not have much of a choice when it comes to the
food that they eat.40 First, we are bombarded with advertisements and
convenient ways to obtain food, both of which are meant to manipulate
our biological disposition to seek “high-energy foods” (i.e., sugar).41
Second, we are the unwitting victims of psychological tactics employed
by food companies that target consumers in order to get us to eat more
food (resulting in increased profits for the vendors and a larger waistline

35. See Art Markman, The Dark Side of Choice in America, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (July
4, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/art-markman-phd/dark-side-of-choice_b_888751.html
[https://perma.cc/32PH-U3LF].
36. Broken Scales, supra note 2, at 1645.
37. See id. at 1654–88.
38. Id. at 1657.
39. Id. at 1656–57.
40. Id. at 1659.
41. Id. at 1678.
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for the consumers).42 For example, many restaurant chains use overhead
speakers to waft music inside the restaurant because it has been shown “to
increase overall spending.”43 Moreover, fast food companies have turned
to chemistry in order to identify the perfect flavors that will “induce [a]
pleasurable response in consumers and sell more burgers and french
fries.”44 Thanks to our psychological disposition toward fundamental
attribution error—a propensity understood and purposefully exploited by
food companies—we are prone to mindlessly engage in overconsumption
of unhealthy products. This begs the question: do we even have a choice
in the matter?
Furthermore, empirical research suggests we are not truly rational
actors.45 Many food corporations, such as Dr Pepper, Snapple Group,
General Mills, and Kraft, have invested an exorbitant amount of money
and resources in food science research in order to sell more product by
taking advantage of our inability to act rationally.46 While we may not be
cognizant of their influence over our inability to make rational decisions
when it comes to the food we eat, these food companies have shamelessly
exploited this inability for decades.
Corporate influence on our food choices (or lack thereof) is most
notable when it comes to overconsumption. Researchers Brian Wansink
and Koert Van Ittersum discuss the problem of overconsumption, placing
the blame primarily on portion sizes.47 They argue that “portion
distortion”48 started in the late 1970s in restaurants and has been
exacerbated by the popularity of fast food and, importantly, by portion
increases in packaged foods sold in grocery stores.49 After examining
studies that confirmed overconsumption is a problem, the authors decline
to hold the consumer themselves responsible for bad habits.50 In fact, they
acknowledge the difficulty of controlling overconsumption through
willpower alone, noting, “[i]t is much easier for a person to change his or
42. Id. at 1678–81.
43. Id. at 1695.
44. Id.
45. Kelli K. Garcia, The Fat Fight: The Risks and Consequences of the Federal Government’s
Failing Public Health Campaign, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 529, 542 (2007) (“More recent studies have
recognized that people are not always rational actors and have thus applied research from cognitive
psychology to illuminate how people behave in the real world.”).
46. See generally MICHAEL MOSS, SALT SUGAR FAT: HOW THE FOOD GIANTS HOOKED US
(2014) [hereinafter MICHAEL MOSS, SALT SUGAR FAT].
47. See Brian Wansink & Koert Van Ittersum, Portion Size Me: Downsizing our Consumption
Norms, 107 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 1103, 1103 (2007), https://foodpsychology.cornell.edu/sites/
default/files/unmanaged_files/portion_size_me_JADA_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GSQ-5BZC].
48. Id. at 1105.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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her environment than to change his or her thinking.”51 While eating a
larger portion over a smaller portion is—in theory—a “choice,” Wansink
and Van Ittersum’s research suggests it is incredibly difficult for
consumers to exercise routine portion control when living in a capitalist
society that eagerly takes advantage of the revenue potential provided by
overconsumption.52
On top of this illusion of choice, we also like to think we are not
susceptible to advertising, when in fact, we are. Most people tend to
believe that advertisements on the Internet, television, billboards, or
elsewhere do not influence their choices whatsoever.53 However, as
evidenced by the fortunes spent by corporations to study consumer
behavior and how we respond to advertisements, they do, in fact, influence
our choices. Michael Moss writes in his popular book “Sugar, Fat, Salt:
How the Food Giants Hooked Us,” that food manufactures are “well
aware” of our addiction to sugar “along with a whole lot more about why
we crave sweets.”54 According to Moore, companies like Kraft have
employees who have had to “tread very carefully” in balancing their desire
to increase sales by creating better products with the knowledge that their
salty, sugary, and fatty foods were causing obesity.55
Perhaps we as a society should follow food corporations’ lead in
investing time, money, and energy in how we think about food rather than
shaming individuals for what and how much they eat. If we can embrace
what food corporations have known for years—that we are not rational
actors when it comes to the food we eat because of our susceptibility to
environment, advertising, and addictive ingredients—then maybe we can
stop blaming poor choices of individuals for the obesity epidemic and
other diet-related health issues and begin to shift blame to the proper party.
II. COMMONSENSE CONSUMPTION ACTS: PAST AND FUTURE
The debate over whether America needs a health transformation is
no longer a debate, as diet-related epidemics become a sad but undeniable
reality. The question is not do we need health reform, but rather, what
method of reform will be the most effective.56 As discussed above, the
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See JEAN KILBOURNE, CAN’T BUY MY LOVE: HOW ADVERTISING CHANGES THE WAY WE
THINK AND FEEL 27 (1999) (“[J]ust about everyone in America still feels personally exempt from
advertising’s influence.”).
54. MICHAEL MOSS, SALT SUGAR FAT, supra note 46, at 4.
55. Id. at 241.
56. See generally Rogan Kersh, The Politics of Obesity: A Current Assessment and Look
Ahead, 87 MILBANK Q. 295 (2009).
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food industry, as well as the general public, too easily places the blame for
food-related health issues on the choices of individuals.57 This is a rampant
societal issue that will not be easy to solve. Assuming, however, that
enough Americans agree that the food industry is responsible for this dire
health crisis, we must next determine which avenue of remedy, justice, and
reform to pursue.
A.

Legislative History

Before politicians and American consumers were aware of this dietrelated health epidemic, creating the need for reform, the food industry
was already pursuing legislative measures to safeguard their goldmine.58
The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) finalized the model
CCA on January 1, 2004.59 The United States House of Representatives
successfully passed what was commonly referred to as the “cheeseburger
bill”60 in the same legislative year, but the bill did not pass in the Senate.61
While the Senate rejected a federal CCA after passing in the House,
food industry lobbyists succeeded in passing many state-level
“cheeseburger bills.” This series of enactments started with Florida62 and
Colorado63 in May of 2004, followed by Washington in June,64 then
Tennessee in July,65 and Michigan in October of that same year.66 South
Dakota67 and Arizona68 ensued shortly after. In 2005, eleven additional
states followed suit, enacting what are now referred to as “Baby
McBills.”69 Utah’s legislature acknowledged it had not yet embraced a law

57. See generally Markman, supra note 35.
58. The food industry was ahead of us when the “Big Food” players collectively drafted
legislation that effectively shielded themselves from class action lawsuits.
59. AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, Commonsense Consumption Act, ALEC.ORG (Jan. 28,
2013), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/commonsense-consumption-act/ [https://perma.cc/KM4FWUQF].
60. CCAs have been referred to as a “cheeseburger bills” or “Baby McBills.”
61. DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, 2 OWEN & DAVIS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 10:10 (4th
ed., May 2016) [hereinafter Owen & Davis].
62. FLA. STAT. § 768.37 (2004).
63. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-1102 (2004).
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.070 (2004).
65. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-34-205 (2004).
66. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2974 (2004).
67. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-61-2 (2004).
68. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-682 (2004).
69. The states that enacted CCAs in 2005 include Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and Wyoming. See generally 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 43
§ 10 (2005); IND. CODE § 34-30-23-1 (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4801 (2005); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 411.610 (West 2005); ME. STAT. 14, § 170 (2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.595 (2005); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 19-23-01 (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.36 (West 2005); OR. REV. STAT.
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limiting the liability of food providers, but ultimately justified enacting the
CCA because “[t]he passage of the Act follows the trend of a majority of
states in the nation that have considered this type of legislation.”70 Today,
a total of twenty-three states have enacted some version of a CCA.71 In
one quick sweep, the food industry used state legislatures to shield itself
from reform.
The Louisiana State Legislature was the only legislature that enacted
its CCA before ALEC’s model, passing its law in June of 2003.72 The
language of Louisiana’s law is typical of a majority of the statutes,
providing:
Any manufacturer, distributor, or seller of a food or nonalcoholic
beverage intended for human consumption shall not be subject to
civil liability for personal injury or wrongful death based on an
individual’s consumption of food or nonalcoholic beverages in cases
where liability is premised upon the individual’s weight gain, obesity,
or a health condition related to weight gain or obesity and resulting
from his long-term consumption of a food or nonalcoholic
beverage.73

Some states’ legislative history have been a bit more controversial.
In Oklahoma, for example, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma rendered the
original CCA void in its entirety.74 In Douglas v. Cox, the court held the
bill violated the single-subject rule75 required by the state’s constitution.76
Albeit a small victory, it was short-lived after the court conceded, “[w]e
do not doubt that tort reform is an important issue for the Legislature.”
After the opinion was issued in June of 2013, the legislature quickly
responded by implementing a new tort protection in September of the same
year.77 Utah and Wisconsin resisted initially, but ultimately enacted their

§ 30.961 (2005); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 138.002 (West 2005); and WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 11-47-103 (West 2005); Owen & Davis, supra note 61.
70. Darci Alter, Tort Law: Prohibition Against Obesity Lawsuits, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 395, 395
(2005).
71. See generally Owen & Davis, supra note 61, app J7.
72. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2799.6 (2012).
73. Id.
74. Douglas v. Cox Ret. Prop., Inc., 302 P.3d 789, 794 (“This is not the first time we have
invalidated a bill in its entirety . . . .”).
75. Id. at 792. Oklahoma’s single-subject rule requires the legislature to embrace one subject
only and to address this subject in its title. One purpose for the rule is to adequately inform citizens
of Oklahoma of the potential effect of the law.
76. Id.
77. OKLA. STAT. tit. 76 § 38 (2013).
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versions of a “Baby McBill” in February and March of 2008,
respectively.78
Notably, half of the states have not joined the trend in enacting
CCAs.79 However, enough states have enacted CCAs to render some form
of tort litigation moot. Unless the CCAs are significantly changed or
repealed all together, the possibility of a tobacco-like litigation reform is
unlikely.
B.

The Legislative Purpose Behind the Enactments

Some state legislatures were clear as to why they were enacting
CCAs, while others were less transparent. Among those less transparent is
the Louisiana State Legislature, the first to enact a CCA.80 Members of the
legislature provided nothing more than a bare legislative procedure of
sessions in which the law was proposed, amended, and eventually
enacted.81 Other state legislatures—such as Alaska, Arizona, and
Georgia—were also mechanical in their enactments, following ALEC’s
format while providing little purpose or substantive incentive behind
passing the law.82 Likewise, an Illinois Senator introduced the bill, gave a
brief description of how it functions, and simply mentioning that other
states have considered similar legislation, of which six actually passed into
law.83 The Senator wrapped up the bill’s introduction noting “[t]his is an
initiative of the Illinois Restaurant Association. The trial Lawyers are
neutral on it.”84 The bill passed with a sweeping fifty-eight ayes and not a
single nay vote.85
On the other hand, Colorado’s lawmakers testified in favor of its
enactment, declaring it necessary to prevent alleged frivolous lawsuits.86
The prime sponsor of the bill, Representative Dr. Lynn Hefley,87 cited
78. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-4-303 (2012); WIS. STAT. § 895.506 (2008).
79. See AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 9. We know twenty-five states
have enacted the law, leaving the rest of the twenty-five states without a CCA on the books.
80. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2799.6 (2012).
81. Louisiana’s State Legislature mentioned its Limitation of Liability for Damages from Longterm Consumption of Food and Nonalcoholic Beverages statute in twelve legislative sessions and three
official reports. See, e.g., H.B. 518, 2003 Original, Reg. Sess. (La. 2003).
82. See generally H.B. 2220, 46th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Az. 2004); H.B. 1519, 2004 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2004).
83. S. 93-3981, 105th Sess., at 28 (Il. 2004).
84. Id. at 29.
85. Id.
86. See generally COLORADO COMMITTEE SUMMARY H.B. 04-1150 BEFORE COLORADO
HOUSE COMMISSION ON THE JUDICIARY, 64th Gen. Assemb. (Co. 2004).
87. Dr. Lynn Hefley is the wife of Joel Hefley, a conservative Republican who also served as
member of United States House of Representatives. WIKIPEDIA (Sept. 1, 2017, 8:30 PM),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joel_Hefley [https://perma.cc/93BU-FZFJ].
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obesity statistics in Colorado and discussed related anecdotes about “other
frivolous lawsuits.”88 Additionally, a representative on behalf of the
Colorado Restaurant Association (CRA) spoke in favor of the bill.89 He
also cited these “frivolous lawsuits” related to obesity and answered the
members’ questions about the differences between “a one-time experience
resulting in a valid injury” and “a pattern of unhealthy eating that is
attributed to the individual’s choice . . . .”90 Similarly, Florida’s
lawmakers asserted it was necessary in wake of the lawsuits filed against
fast food corporations where plaintiff’s alleged “health-related injuries due
to weight gain . . . .”91 However, lawmakers could only cite to Pelman to
support this assertion.92 More significantly, the legislature explicitly
referenced the successful tobacco litigation as a motivating factor behind
enacting its CCA.93
The titles of the statutes also provide insight into the purpose behind
their enactments. Ironically, Idaho’s CCA is located in the “Health and
Safety” section of its state legislature, with the inflammatory title:
“Prevention of frivolous lawsuits.”94 On the other hand, South Dakota’s
statute title is unambiguous as to its purpose and structure: “Prohibition on
recovery based on claims of weight gain, obesity, or health condition
resulting from long-term consumption of qualified product.”95 Likewise,
Kansas’ reads: “Immunity from liability for claims arising out of weight
gain or obesity.”96 In other words, the goal of these statutes is clear: to
prevent class action lawsuits related to the excessive consumption of
unhealthy food manufactured by “Big Food” companies.
C. The Future of CCAs
Even though there was a flurry of legislation in the early 2000s, it
appears the Baby McBills have lost steam. Currently, nothing is pending
in the state legislatures, which have abstained from enacting CCAs up until

88. See generally COLORADO COMMITTEE SUMMARY H.B. 04-1150 BEFORE COLORADO HOUSE
COMMISSION ON THE JUDICIARY, 64th Gen. Assemb. (Co. 2004) (statement of Pete Meersman,
representative, Colorado Restaurant Association).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. H.B. 333, 2004 Staff Analysis, Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2004).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. IDAHO CODE § 39-8702 (2004).
95. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-61-2 (2004).
96. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4801 (2005).
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this point.97 Furthermore, no federal legislation has been enacted (although
it was attempted in 2005).98 It is unclear what the future holds for CCAs.
For now, twenty-three states are blocking the potential for tort reform
against the food industry, but this has proven to be enough to prevent the
progression of tort litigation in this context.
III. FORESEEABLE OBSTACLES
While tort reform should be a viable option for reforming the food
industry, it has foreseeable obstacles. For example, the plaintiffs in the
potential lawsuits against “Big Food” are likely to face similar challenges
to those faced by the plaintiffs in the “Big Tobacco” litigations. Moreover,
defense lawyers will have the ability to be cleverer, more cunning, and
more knowledgeable in their arguments against this “Big Food” litigation.
A.

Issues with Tort Reform in the Big Food Litigation Context

As evidenced by the court’s ruling in Pelman, the biggest issue
plaintiffs have in bringing a tort action (class action or otherwise) against
the food industry is causation.99 Although obesity’s exact cause remains
highly debated, scientists and doctors alike have suggested ways to combat
the disease,100 which indicates that we have an idea of its cause. What we
do know is that Americans eat at least 10% of their total caloric intake in
added sugars (primarily found in processed foods produced in large part
by the ten companies discussed above).101 In a study published in JAMA
Internal Medicine, “participants who took in 25% or more of their daily
calories as sugar were more than twice as likely to die from heart disease
as those whose diets included less than 10% of added sugar.”102 Foods like
cookies, cakes, pastries, fruit drinks, ice cream, frozen yogurt, and candy,
and beverages such as sodas, energy drinks, and sports drinks account for
97. See Posts Tagged ‘common sense consumption acts,’ PHAI (Aug. 26, 2013), http://
www.phaionline.org/tag/common-sense-consumption-acts/ [https://perma.cc/BF8L-3QG7].
98. See generally Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 544, 109th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2005).
99. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 523 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003) (“However,
plaintiffs must allege that they have eaten primarily, if not wholly, at McDonalds of New York outlets.
In other words, a plaintiff who has lived for merely a year in New York State—and thus eaten at outlets
run by McDonalds of New York only for one year—may have a difficult time in showing causation.”).
100. Jeremy H. Rogers, Living on the Fat of the Land: How to Have Your Burger and Sue It Too,
81 WASH. U.L.Q. 859, 865 (2003).
101. Julie Corliss, Eating too much added sugar increases the risk of dying with heart disease,
HARV. HEALTH PUBLICATIONS (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/eating-toomuch-added-sugar-increases-the-risk-of-dying-with-heart-disease-201402067021
[https://perma.cc/4AVT-SZS7].
102. Id.
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much of the overconsumption of added sugar.103 Although it is “wellknown” that the intake of added sugar is linked to weight gain,104 it will
remain difficult to prove the legal theory that the defendant’s specific
product was the direct cause of the plaintiff’s obesity.
Another obstacle facing tort reform in this context is the existence of
state consumer protection laws. Most states enacted these laws after being
prompted by a speech by President Kennedy in 1962, entitled, “The
Regulation of Advertising.”105 In this speech, President Kennedy intended
to promote 1) the right to safety, 2) the right to be informed, 3) the right to
choose among products, and 4) the right to be heard as a consumer.106 The
purpose behind consumer protection laws is to empower consumers;
however, the existence of these laws allows Big Food to argue that it was
in compliance with the applicable state consumer protection laws, it did
not abuse its advertising rights, and it did not prohibit the consumers’ right
to choose whether or not to purchase their product.
Finally, as discussed in Part I. B., the plaintiffs in these cases have a
scientifically supported argument that choosing to eat food that negatively
impacts their health is, for the most part, an illusion and not entirely the
plaintiffs’ fault. Regardless, the defense of personal responsibility and
autonomy will almost certainly be raised.107 Although both sides have
seemingly persuasive arguments, it is highly possible that a court would
find, as it did in Pelman, that “[n]obody is forced to eat at McDonalds.”108
However, the argument is not that these cases are airtight; rather, it is that
these plaintiffs should have their day in court. As long as CCAs are on the
books, this is not a possibility. Just as it took time, money, and social
acceptance to have successful tobacco litigation (discussed further in Part
III. B.), the same would apply to Big Food litigation.109
B.

How Tort Law Reformed the Tobacco Industry

The impetus behind the tobacco litigation was the widespread
information in the national press about the health risks involved in

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Robert M. Langer, State Consumer Protection Laws, in THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
– AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, C612 ALI-ABA 355, 358 (Feb. 28,
1991).
106. Id.
107. See Rogers, supra note 100, at 864.
108. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 533 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003).
109. See infra Part III. B.
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smoking.110 As a result of this information, lawsuits began to flourish as
people tried to sue tobacco companies “for injuries they believed were
caused by smoking.”111 Taking down “Big Tobacco” was no small feat.
Forty years and 1,800 lawsuits later, lawyers and plaintiffs were finally
awarded a victory over Big Tobacco for smoking related illness.112
In 1954, the case Lowe v. R.J. Reynolds initiated the “first wave” of
the tobacco litigation.113 The first wave was largely unsuccessful because
the tobacco companies refused to settle and employed familiar delay
tactics via discovery requests and procedural motions.114 However, a new
doctrinal development occurred in the 1960s–70s, which enabled the
“second wave” to be more successful.115 Namely, comparative fault
liability breathed new life into these plaintiffs’ claims, as well as “an
increased scientific knowledge about the health effects of cigarettes” and
the continued public commentary of the dangers of tobacco use.116 The
third and final wave, which began in 1994, engaged the public even further
by emphasizing public, rather than private, goals.117 Specifically, the
success can be attributed to the idea that “[o]nce smoking is recognized as
an addiction that usually begins while the smoker is a minor, it can more
readily be perceived as a public health matter, rather than a question of
individual choice.”118 Moreover, the plaintiffs’ attorneys were able to
reveal information in discovery that finally drove the tobacco defendants
to start settling cases.119 Discovery shed new light “on the industry’s
knowledge of the addictiveness of tobacco, as well as its intentional
manipulation of nicotine levels and marketing to minors.”120
C.

Comparing “Big Tobacco” Litigation with “Big Food”
Litigation

Several parallels between the potential for Big Food litigation and
what transpired during the Big Tobacco litigation exist. First, the litigation
would target a pressing public health concern: obesity. Second, the
litigation would face the same set of legal obstacles that the plaintiffs’
attorneys in the tobacco litigation had to overcome (assumption of risk,
110. Wendy E. Parmet, Tobacco, HIV, and the Courtroom: The Role of Affirmative Litigation in
the Formation of Public Health Policy, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1663, 1672 (1999).
111. Id.
112. Rogers, supra note 100, at 861.
113. Parmet, supra note 110, at 1673.
114. Id. at 1674.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1675.
117. Id. at 1676.
118. Id. at 1677.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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causation, individual choice, etc.). Third, similar to the deep-pocketed
tobacco industry, the food industry, with its ten powerful members, has to
the means to combat litigation. Finally, the products that are causing
concern (tobacco as well as sugar, fat, and salt) are documented as highly
addictive and cause negative impacts on the health of Americans. Because
of these similarities, the possibility of reforming the food industry with the
same method of mass litigation is not only possible—it was predicted as
probable.
In 2003, the general counsel for the American Tort Reform
Association (ATRA), along with seasoned lawyers from both the plaintiff
and defense side, said the years ahead hold serious tobacco-like litigation
against the food industry.121 Not coincidentally, this prediction was
documented one year before CCAs were enacted. Similarly, in fall of
2003, the Washington University Law Quarterly published a Note
predicting more lawsuits like Pelman and S.F. would be initiated for two
reasons: “(1) there are nearly 100 million overweight people in America,
and Big Food serves them products that contribute to their weight
problems; and (2) caring for overweight and obese people costs
approximately $157 billion per year, and Big Food can afford to subsidize
these costs.”122 Unbeknownst to the lawyers, the ATRA, and the author of
Living on the Fat of the Land: How to Have Your Burger and Sue It Too,
the food industry also saw the writing on the wall and effectively blocked
tobacco-like litigation by turning to the legislature and lobbying for a tort
shield. Unfortunately, these predictions no longer had the legal avenue to
come to fruition.
While the type of tort reform that successfully took down the tobacco
industry has the potential to do the same to the food industry, reforming
the food industry using this method would face unique obstacles. For one,
the food industry can learn from the mistakes of the tobacco industry
before litigating against potential plaintiffs. In other words, the food
industry can take notes about what did not work for the Big Tobacco
defendants in order to avoid the same litigation pitfalls fighting the Big
Food plaintiffs.
121. Roger Parloff, Is Fat the Next Tobacco? For Big Food, the Supersizing of America is
Becoming a Big Headache, FORTUNE MAG. (Feb. 3, 2003), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/
fortune/fortune_archive/2003/02/03/336442/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/5ABT-ZQQZ]
(“The
precedents, the ammo, the missiles are already there and waiting in a silo marked ‘tobacco,’ says
Victor Schwartz, general counsel of the American Tort Reform Association.” (internal citations
omitted)).
122. See Rogers supra note 100, at 861 (proposing that Big Food litigation was a feasible way
for states to regain money incurred from Medicaid expenses associated with treating overweight and
obese people). This proposition still rings true if CCAs are repealed.
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Moreover, eventually, smokers became somewhat like social
pariahs. It was no longer “cool” to smoke, but rather seen as a disgusting
and repulsive habit. Thus, what was once a status custom became a
nemesis to society. Not only did the general public disapprove of smoking,
but the press, politicians, and state attorneys general got involved in
spreading the “must quit” message.123 According to Roger Parloff, author
of the editorial piece “Is Fat the Next Tobacco?,” the public attack on
tobacco was “very powerful,” and tort reform only works if society has
been persuaded that the “object of attack is some kind of pariah.”124 While
doctors, dentists, and kale–eaters may frown upon eating a cheeseburger,
is still largely an accepted and often celebrated pastime. It certainly helps
that eating healthily, exercising, and living a healthy lifestyle have become
increasingly popular, but we are still far from considering soda drinkers
societal pariahs. Unless eating unhealthily becomes as socially
unacceptable as smoking, successful tort reform will be difficult to pursue
without the same degree of awareness and public support.
In order to move health reform forward, one way to distinguish the
fight against unhealthy food from tobacco is the long list of long-term
health affects as a result of eating junk food. The health problems
associated with tobacco use, while also incredibly serious and
disconsolate, are limited. On the other hand, the negative health effects of
eating an excessive amount of sugar, fat, and sodium are virtually endless.
Furthermore, as Parloff noted in his article, once weight is gained, it is
“notoriously hard to lose.”125 This is especially bothersome when it comes
to childhood obesity. For the most part, the general public is aware of the
dire need for a health transformation. Thus, the message must be that
change can occur by influencing the products distributed by the food
industry. But the food industry is not going to change on its own. It must
be pushed, like the tobacco industry, to make a substantial change that will
benefit nearly every consumer in America.
Eventually, the tobacco industry agreed to settle the disputes by
paying $246 billion to the states themselves (some juries required the
tobacco companies to pay individuals, too).126 Successfully holding the
food companies legally accountable for the obesity epidemic could lead to
many positive outcomes, but perhaps the most politically and socially
enticing would be distributing the damages to states to recover healthcare
funding. Rather than fork out individual payouts to individual plaintiffs,

123. Parloff, supra note 121.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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the public might have an easier time supporting putting money back into
government programs to provide for better healthcare.
CONCLUSION
CCAs should be repealed to make room for tobacco-like litigation
that many experts expected to plague the food industry. As long as CCAs
block the possibility of tort reform, food companies will continue to
deceive consumers and Americans’ health will continue to decline.
Because the companies that dominate the food industry have demonstrated
their profit-driven agenda in providing products that are highly detrimental
to the health of their consumers (a majority of Americans), they should be
held accountable for their actions. Similar to the success of “Big Tobacco”
litigation, tort reform has the potential to play a significant role in
launching “Big Food” litigation. Although foreseeable legal and societal
obstacles exist, the dire necessity of creating a healthier generation of
Americans alone should, at the very least, move the conversation forward.

